ಕವಾಚ್ ಸ್ವಯಂಚಾಲಿತ ರೈಲು ಸಂರಕ್ಷಣಾ ವ್ಯವಸ್ಥೆ ಮತ್ತು ಒಡಿಶಾ ರೈಲು ಅಪಘಾತ

Good Day,

Please note that Kavach like any other train protection system relies on track embeded speed pick ups and automatic distant signals apply automatic brakes on the locomotive. In the case of the Coromandel Express disaster, the point position was “manually doctored by reversing direction cables either at the location box or relay room ” causing facing point indication lit yellow at control room local panel, fooling the automatic interlock system into allowing the station master to set the home signal, starter signal and advanced starter signal to green for the up main line, thereby allowing incoming Coromandel Express to pass through at 130 t kmph. Unfortunately the Kavach is not idiot proof as does not cater for similar “doctoring of point position” however Kavach has a design weakness because if we assume a situation where the point position was reversed with the correct red indication in control panel and due to some error the automatic interlocking system allowed the SM to set up & lock the main line as above, there would be insufficient breaking distance available to avoid derailment or collision at loop line. The Railways must look into this as the number of incidents involving unauthorised tampering of signals has significantly increased . However, if we consider similar goods train loop line collision at Bankura on 25th June, if Kavach was fitted, it would have prevented SPAD, as Kavach would have automatically applied the brakes and the locomotive would have come to a stop before the red home signal. What is surprising that in this case, that after a very brief inquest the Railways authorities have blamed the loco pilot of SPAD due to “micro sleeping” and have rather hastily closed the case where in-fact there are several unanswered questions on the action of the Station Master as he should have monitored the incoming freight train and alerted the loco pilot on walkie talkie as it hurtled into his railway station without any hint of slowing down. Also there are questions being asked why the facing point was not set to reverse position from the local control panel in control room after the loop line was occupied with a stationary train after the loop line, especially when the operator was aware of an incoming freight train as SPAD was always a possibility …. in-fact the possibility turned into reality ? Too many incidents, near misses which alarming as indicates systemic failure within the Indian Railways Safety management System and responsible stakeholders turning a blind eye . Infact CBI should investigate all related cases and come up with the bitter truth or the Govt should seriously consider in privatising the Indian Railways as with such dismal safety standards we will never be able to compete with the Chinese who ae now operating Maglev at 430 kmps service speeds. The operation of the Shinkansen ( Japanese bullet trains) at 280 kmph service speeds should be handed over to private entity as you need organisations with zero casualty risk status to operate such trains. The common man is now scared to travel by rail and its pathetic to see how a sensational breaking story seeking Indian media seems to have stopped perusing this serous issue once the fever to the Coromandel Express accident has died down …. Will it require another such accident where innocent lives are lost for the media to wake up …. shameful !

Please note like any other train protection system, Kavach relies on embedded speed pick-ups and automatic distant signals to automatically apply emergency brakes on the locomotive causing the train to stop taking into consideration the trains speed and the relative breaking distance. In the case of the Coromandel Express disaster, since the CBI is taking an eternity to complete their investigation, we are of the opinion that the position of the facing point was “manually doctored by reversing direction cables either from the location box or relay room ” causing facing point yellow indication to be lit up in local panel, fooling the so called failsafe automatic interlock system into allowing the station master to set the home signal, starter signal and advanced starter signal for the up main line from red to green, thereby indicating to loco pilot of incoming Coromandel Express to pass through at speed of 130 kmph. Unfortunately, Kavach is not idiot proof as does not cater for similar “doctoring of point position” by idiots belonging to the Indian Railways S&T Dept, although Kavach does have a design weakness because if we are to consider a similar scenario however in this case we assuming an extremely unlikely situation where point is set in reverse position with red indication on the control panel and due to some software error the automatic interlocking system malfunctions without any alarm, thereby allowing an unsuspecting station master to set & lock the main line for incoming Coromandel Express , an active Kavach would get activated only when the train started to pass over the point and by the time emergency brakes came on Coromandel Express would have either derailed at the entry bend of the loop line or would have collided with the stationary goods train due to insufficient breaking distance available on the loop line. The Kavach design must factor in such unlikely situations as there have been several major incidents of late, involving unauthorised tampering of signals. However, for a similar incident involving a major collision of two goods train on loop line at Bankura, on 25th June, if Kavach was fitted it would have prevented SPAD, as Kavach automatically apply emergency brakes well in advance ensuring incoming goods train would come to a stop position well before crossing the red home signal.
The way the Indian Railways have handled the goods train collision incident at Bankura leaves lot to be desired as it seems they were in great hurry to close the case with undue publicity. After a brief inquest by their safety officer, Indian Railways blamed the loco pilot of SPAD due to “micro sleeping” and have rather hastily closed the case without further investigation on the root cause for loco pilots falling asleep on duty, especially since Railways aware of this problem. There are several unanswered questions on the action taken by the Station Master, as he should have monitored the incoming freight train and alerted the loco pilot on walkie talkie as it hurtled towards his railway station without any hint of slowing down and stopping before the red home signal. Also, there are questions being asked why the facing point was not set to reverse position since the loop line was now occupied by another goods train, and why was this abnormal condition not picked up by the Automatic Interlock System and alerted the Station Master on the potential risk prompting SPAD prevention action like using the walkie talkie to communicate with loco pilot? The number of major incidents and near misses within a short span of time indicates systemic failure of the Safety management System and way Indian Railways have reacted highlights complacency which is an extremely dangerous situation as responsible stakeholders starts turning a blind eye. In-fact the CBI should be given the authority to investigate all related cases and come up with the bitter truth or the Govt should seriously consider in privatising the Indian Railways as with such dismal safety standards we will never be able to modernize the Railways and compete with the Chinese who are now operating Maglev at 430 kmps service speeds. The operation of the Shinkansen (Japanese bullet trains) at 250 kmph service speeds should be handed over to separate organization as you need zero risk status on casualty to safely operate such high-speed trains. The common man is now scared to travel by rail and its pathetic to see how a sensational news seeking Indian press & digital media have stopped perusing the authorities on CBI investigation reports and CRS reports on related incidents. Does have to take another Coromandel Express incident to occur for the media to wake up and be responsible in drawing the attention of civil society and other responsible stake holders in pressuring the Govt to seriously investigate alleged systemic failures that seem to have plagued the Indian Railways for a while! Really shameful!

Please note like any other train protection system, Kavach is an intelligent software using a complex array of algorithms which is probably looped in with ML ( machine learning) capable of continuous real time monitoring and predictive analysis of source data from embedded speed pick-ups and automatic distant signals, enabling timely and remote activation of emergency brakes on the locomotive causing the train to come to a stop position before any projected hazard, taking into consideration the relative breaking distance basis time lag to initiate a stop signal and the relative speed of the train. In the case of the Coromandel Express, since the CBI is taking an eternity to complete their accident investigation, we are of the opinion that the position of the facing point was “manually doctored by simply reversing direction cables by using a jumper either at the location box or relay room, causing facing point yellow indication to be lit up on local panel, fooling the so called failsafe automatic interlock system into allowing the not so innocent station master to set and lock the home, starter and advanced starter signals from red to green for the up main line, thereby indicating to the loco pilot of incoming Coromandel Express to safely pass through at a speed of 130 kmph. Unfortunately, Kavach is not idiot proof as does not cater for similar “doctoring of point position” by certain idiots belonging to the Indian Railways S&T Dept. However, if we are to consider recent incidents, Kavach may have a design weakness if we apply similar sequence of events, but altering the cause in order to simulate an unlikely situation where point is set in reverse position which shows up correctly as a red indication on the control panel and due to some software glitch the automatic interlocking system malfunctions without warning indication, thereby allowing an unsuspecting station master to set & lock the main line for incoming Coromandel Express, an active Kavach in place would have recognized a hazard situation only when the train started to ride past the point machine and by the time Kavach initiated emergency stop signal, the Coromandel Express would have already derailed at the entry bend of the loop line or would have collided with the stationary goods train, simply because there was insufficient breaking distance available on an occupied loop line for the given speed at which the train had entered the loop line. The Kavach design will have to factor in such unlikely situations as there have been several major incidents of late, involving unauthorised tampering of signals. However, for a similar incident involving a major collision of two goods train on loop line at Bankura, on 25th June, an active Kavach would have prevented SPAD, as Kavach would have automatically applied emergency brakes well in advance, ensuring incoming goods train would come to a stop position well before the red home signal. In context, the way the Indian Railways have handled the collision incident at Bankura, leaves a lot to be desired as it seemed they wanted to close the case quickly and without any undue publicity. After a brief inquest by their safety officer, Indian Railways blamed the loco pilots of SPAD for “micro sleeping” and closed the case without further investigation on the root cause for loco pilots to fall asleep on duty, f especially since Indian Railways aware of several recent SPAD related incidents. There are several unanswered questions on the action taken by the Station Master, as he should have monitored the incoming freight train and alerted the loco pilot on walkie talkie as it hurtled towards his railway station without any hint of slowing down and stopping before the red home signal. There are also questions being asked why the facing point was not set to reverse position after the loop line was occupied by another goods train and why was this abnormal condition not picked up by the Automatic Interlock System which should have alerted the Station Master on the potential operating risk, prompting SPAD prevention procedures, e.g. making use the of walkie talkie in order to communicate with the loco pilot or the guard ? The frequency of major incidents and reported near misses is an extremely alarming situation as it indicates systemic failure of the Safety Management System and way the Indian Railways have reacted does suggest complacency and with responsible stakeholders turning a blind eye, the common man will keep paying with their lives. In-fact the CBI should be given the authority to investigate all related cases and come up with the bitter truth or the Government should seriously consider in privatising the Indian Railways, as such dismal safety standards will prevent the modernising of our antiquated railway systems as compared to the Chinese who are now operating Maglev at 430 kmps service speeds. Even the Shinkansen (Japanese bullet trains) operation at 250 kmph service speeds should be handed over to organization reputed for extremely high safety standards. The common man is now scared to travel by rail and frankly its rather pathetic to see how the sensational news grabbing press & digital media have now gone silent on CBI investigation reports and CRS reports on recent related incidents. Does have to take another Coromandel Express for the media to wake up and take the responsibility in garnering support from civil society and other responsible stake holders in pressuring the Government to appoint a joint parliamentary committee with the mandate to reform the Indian Railways as deemed necessary

Please note like any other train protection system, Kavach is an intelligent software using a complex array of algorithms which is probably looped in with ML ( machine learning) capable of continuous real time monitoring and predictive analysis of source data from embedded speed pick-ups and automatic distant signals, enabling timely and remote activation of emergency brakes on the locomotive causing the train to come to a stop position before any projected hazard, taking into consideration the relative breaking distance basis time lag to initiate a stop signal and the relative speed of the train. In the case of the Coromandel Express, since the CBI is taking an eternity to complete their accident investigation, we are of the opinion that the position of the facing point was “manually doctored by simply reversing direction cables by using a jumper either at the location box or relay room, causing facing point yellow indication to be lit up on local panel, fooling the so called failsafe automatic interlock system into allowing the not so innocent station master to set and lock the home, starter and advanced starter signals from red to green for the up main line, thereby indicating to the loco pilot of incoming Coromandel Express to safely pass through at a speed of 130 kmph. Unfortunately, Kavach is not idiot proof as does not cater for similar “doctoring of point position” by certain idiots belonging to the Indian Railways S&T Dept. However, if we are to consider recent incidents, Kavach may have a design weakness if we apply similar sequence of events, but altering the cause in order to simulate an unlikely situation where point is set in reverse position which shows up correctly as a red indication on the control panel and due to some software glitch the automatic interlocking system malfunctions without warning indication, thereby allowing an unsuspecting station master to set & lock the main line for incoming Coromandel Express, an active Kavach in place would have recognized a hazard situation only when the train started to ride past the point machine and by the time Kavach initiated emergency stop signal, the Coromandel Express would have already derailed at the entry bend of the loop line or would have collided with the stationary goods train, simply because there was insufficient breaking distance available on an occupied loop line for the given speed at which the train had entered the loop line. The Kavach design will have to factor in such unlikely situations as there have been several major incidents of late, involving unauthorised tampering of signals. However, for a similar incident involving a major collision of two goods train on loop line at Bankura, on 25th June, an active Kavach would have prevented SPAD, as Kavach would have automatically applied emergency brakes well in advance, ensuring incoming goods train would come to a stop position well before the red home signal. In context, the way the Indian Railways have handled the collision incident at Bankura, leaves a lot to be desired as it seemed they wanted to close the case quickly and without any undue publicity. After a brief inquest by their safety officer, Indian Railways blamed the loco pilots of SPAD for “micro sleeping” and closed the case without further investigation on the root cause for loco pilots to fall asleep on duty, f especially since Indian Railways aware of several recent SPAD related incidents. There are several unanswered questions on the action taken by the Station Master, as he should have monitored the incoming freight train and alerted the loco pilot on walkie talkie as it hurtled towards his railway station without any hint of slowing down and stopping before the red home signal. There are also questions being asked why the facing point was not set to reverse position after the loop line was occupied by another goods train and why was this abnormal condition not picked up by the Automatic Interlock System which should have alerted the Station Master on the potential operating risk, prompting SPAD prevention procedures, e.g. making use the of walkie talkie in order to communicate with the loco pilot or the guard ? The frequency of major incidents and reported near misses is an extremely alarming situation as it indicates systemic failure of the Safety Management System and way the Indian Railways have reacted does suggest complacency and with responsible stakeholders turning a blind eye, the common man will keep paying with their lives. In-fact the CBI should be given the authority to investigate all related cases and come up with the bitter truth or the Government should seriously consider in privatising the Indian Railways, as such dismal safety standards will prevent the modernising of our antiquated railway systems as compared to the Chinese who are now operating Maglev at 430 kmps service speeds. Even the Shinkansen (Japanese bullet trains) operation at 250 kmph service speeds should be handed over to organization reputed for extremely high safety standards. The common man is now scared to travel by rail and frankly its rather pathetic to see how the sensational news grabbing press & digital media have now gone silent on CBI investigation reports and CRS reports on recent related incidents. Does have to take another Coromandel Express for the media to wake up and take the responsibility in garnering support from civil society and other responsible stake holders in pressuring the Government to appoint a joint parliamentary committee with the mandate to reform the Indian Railways as deemed necessary.

please refer to this edited version